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lN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
H. WILLIAM NALDER, CATHERINE 
NALDER and H. WILLIAM NALDER, 
JR., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
KELLOGG SALES COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 8313 
The plaintiffs in this action (respondents herein) 
filed suit against defendant (appellant herein) alleging 
that they had been damaged in their business as turkey 
raisers in the years 1952, 1953 and 1954 because of de-
fendant's failure to release real estate and chattel mort-
gages executed by the plaintiffs and delivered to defend-
ant in connection with certain financing agreements be-
tween the parties in the years 1949, 1950 and 1951. The 
plaintiffs' contention is to the effect that the existence of 
the mortgages upon the records in Davis County, Utah, 
prevented them from securing turkey financing from 
other companies, interfered with their credit and pre-
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vented them from raising the number of turkeys during 
the years of 1952, 1953 and 1954, they claim they in-
tended to and were capable of raising, which, had plain-
tiffs been able to secure the necessary financing, would 
have resulted in profits of $129,700.80. (R. 1-2) 
The defendant denied the material allegations of the 
wrong alleged and of the damages claimed and counter-
claimed to foreclose a real estate mortgage from the plain-
tiffs, H. William N alder, Sr. and Catherine N alder, his 
wife. (R. 4-11 ) 
Issues were framed and the case proceeded to trial 
before the court without a jury and resulted in a judg-
ment, findings of fact and conclusions of law by which 
plaintiffs were awarded the sum of $90,950.10 after de-
ducting the sum of $6,584.10 which the court found was 
owing by plaintiffs to defendant upon the note and mort-
gage alleged in defendant's counterclaim. (R. 22-25) 
Within the required time after judgment, defendant 
filed its motion for new trial, which, after argument, was 
denied and the case is now before this court on appeal 
both from the judgment and the order denying the mo-
tion for new trial. 
It should be observed at this point that plaintiffs' 
complaint contained a second cause of action, which at 
the trial was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs with preju-
dice and upon their own motion. (R. 44) Consequently, 
matters relating to the second cause of action are not be-
fore this court. 
The record in this case shows without dispute that 
prior to 1949, plaintiff, H. William Nalder, Sr., made 
plans and preparations for going into the turkey raising 
business. Neither Nalder, Sr. nor Jr. had ever engaged in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
that business before that time. (T. 80-81) Among other 
preparations which Nalder Sr. had made was to build and 
equip a brooder house capable of receiving about 6,000 
turkey poults. (T. 18) In 1949, H. William Nalder, Sr. 
made a partnership arrangement with his son, H. William 
Nalder, Jr. and they jointly launched their turkey busi-
ness. (T. 16-17, 138) 
It should here be noted that plaintiff, Catherine Nald-
er, wife of H. William Nalder, Sr., was not a member of 
the partnership, and had no interest in the enterprise. Not-
withstanding this fact, the trial court entered judgment in 
Mrs. Nalder's favor. Concerning this action of the trial 
court, we shall have more to say hereafter. 
Because N alder Sr. and Jr. were financially unable to 
carry on the turkey business without credit for each of 
the years 1949, 1950, 1951, they entered into a contract 
with the defendant whereby, in exchange for their agree-
ment to use defendant's feed preparations, defendant 
agreed to advance the cost of turkey poults and the neces-
sary feed to grow and mature them for market. Turkey 
finance agreements for 1949, 1950 and 1951 are involved 
in this case. All were the same except for variation in 
amount and year, and defendant's Exhibit 1, which is the 
contract for 1949, is typical of the other two. To secure 
the defendant for these advances, and in addition to sign-
ing the turkey finance contracts, Nalder Sr. and Jr., each 
year for the three years in question, signed and delivered 
to defendant promissory notes for the estimated amount 
of their requirements and secured the notes with chattel 
mortgages upon the turkeys and their machinery and equip-
ment used in the business. The promissory notes are not 
in the record, but the chattel mortgages are part of the 
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record as Exhibits uA-1," ttA-2," and uA-3." It will be 
specifically observed that neither the turkey finance con-
tracts nor the chattel mortgages were signed by plaintiff, 
Catherine Nalder. Here again it is pertinent to point out 
that notwithstanding this fact, judgment was entered by 
the trial court in Mrs. Nalder's favor for damages for de-
fendant's failure or refusal to release these chattel mort-
gages, which she never signed. This action of the trial 
court can only be accounted for upon the theory that she 
sustained damage because they were not released. The 
only proof of damage in the record relates solely to the 
turkey business in which Mrs. Nalder had no interest. Our 
comments with regard to this most startling action of the 
trial court will likewise be discussed hereafter. 
The financing provided by defendant for 1949 was 
about $26,000.00. This was made up of an initial esti-
mate of $24,000.00 which proved to be insufficient. Some-
time before September 14, 1949, it was determined that 
an additional $2,000.00 would be needed and defendant 
was requested to and did advance this additional sum. 
This advance was secured by a real estate mortgage upon 
the home of Mr. and Mrs. Nalder, Sr. (Ex. ttC-2"; T. 21-
22, 86-87, Ex. 2-1, Ex. 2-2, T. 90, 259, 267) 
Plaintiff, H. William Nalder, Jr., did not execute 
this mortgage or any other real estate mortgage involved 
in this case. Entirely inconsistent with this fact, the trial 
court proceeded to award him damages for defendant's 
alleged refusal to release real estate mortgages and added 
a penalty in a like amount to the actual damages found to 
have been sustained. 
Late in the year 1949, the turkey crop raised to ma-
turity by Nalder Sr. and Jr. was processed and placed in 
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storage. Between April, 1950 and July, 1950, this crop 
was sold with a resulting loss of over $6,000.00. Out of 
the original 6,000 poults with which the Nalders began 
operations, they matured 3,400 birds. They lost 1,400 
birds in the brooder and 1,000 more during the season. 
(Ex. uD", Tr. 22, 26, 46, 41, 81, 86, 121) 
In spite of the 1949 loss the defendant agreed to and 
did finance the Nalders' 1950 operations. Under the 1950 
chattel mortgage (Ex. uA-2") defendant advanced $23,-
300.00. As in 1949 the estimate for the 1950 crop 
proved inadequate and responsive to the N alders' request, 
defendant made additional advances of $3,600.00. To 
secure the additional advance Nalders gave defendant an-
other real estate mortgage (Ex. uC-9") which included 
the unpaid 1949 debt totaling $6,555.12 of which 
$5,627.39 was principal and $927.73 was accrued interest. 
(Exs. uC-9", 4, uC-8", uD", uy"; Tr. 86, 93, 94, 258, 
259, 267, 268). 
In April, 1950, Mr. and Mrs. Nalder, Sr. executed a 
real estate mortgage (Ex. uC-3") which was recorded but 
under which no advances were ever made. The real estate 
mortgages of April 1, 1950 and August 15, 1950 (Ex. 
uC-3" and uC-9") contained the specific provision that 
they were given to secure any and all debts owing by Mr. 
and Mrs. Nalder, Sr. and Jr. to defendant. The promis-
sory notes secured by the mortgage of August 15, 19 50 
(Ex ... C-9") were dated July 28, 1950 (Ex. uC-8" and 
Ex. 4). 
The result of the 1950 operation was that Nalders 
were able to pay off all advances made for that year with 
a surplus of about $1,000.00 which was applied to pay 
accrued interest on the 1949 debt owing defendant. (Tr. 
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27; Exs. uE-5", uD") Something like 5,000 birds were 
raised and marketed that year. 
In 1951 the Nalders raised about 6,000 turkeys. (Tr. 
3 3, 110; Ex. ((D") From the 19 51 operation the N alders 
made about $400.00 over and above the costs and expense 
incurred in raising and marketing. (Ex. uD", uF-9-15", 
Ex. ui-8"; Tr. 35, 40, 41, 44-46) They operated that 
year under a financing program calling for 125% of esti-
mated cost and gave their note and chattel mortgage se-
curing the financing for $42,825.00. (Ex. uA-3") 
The record clearly reflects that defendant made all of 
the advances that were required to enable Nalder, Sr. and 
Jr. to raise turkeys in 1949, 1950 and 1951 (Tr. 83, 88-9, 
262, 268-69) 
The portions of the record above referred to also re-
flect the results of the N alders' turkey operations. In ad-
dition, it is significant to add plaintiffs' own appraisal of 
the success which they had achieved, made prior to the 
time that they asserted any claim that defendant had de-
stroyed their business for which it should pay them 
$129,700.80. They clearly acknowledged without equivo-
cation their complete failure to operate their business suc-
cessfully. (Ex. uF-4", uF-21 ", Ex. ul") 
At the end of 1951 defendant declined to finance 
Nalder, Sr. and Jr. any longer. They had failed to sub-
stantially reduce the amount of their indebtedness to de-
fendant which had been carried over from 1949t In ad-
dition, irregularities were discovered in Nalders' dealings 
with defendant. They had sold turkeys covered by de-
fendant's 1951 chattel mortgage and had not accounted 
for the proceeds (Ex. uF-4", uF-16"; Tr. 36, 38, 43-45, 
111, 112) In fact they never did account for all the 
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turkeys which they raised that year though repeated de-
mands for an accounting were made. 
Late in the fall of 1951 a conference was held be-
tween the Nalders and Mr. Williams and Mr. Aust repre-
senting the defendant for the purpose of discussing the 
liquidation of the amount owing defendant. H. William 
Nalder, Sr. and Mrs. Nalder, Sr. met Mr. Williams and 
Mr. Aust at the Hotel Utah. It is their contention that 
when the subject of financing for 1952 was raised Williams 
not only refused to extend further credit but went fur-
ther and threatened that he would prevent the Nalders 
from getting credit elsewhere. (Tr. 47, 107-8, 113-16, 
177-79, 182, 184-5) This is emphatically denied by Wil-
liams. (Tr. 265-67, 269) Far more persuasive than 
N alders' claims are letters and documents which reflect 
that no such threat was ever voiced, much less carried out. 
(Ex ... F-16-25", Ex. 3, Ex. ((G-2") Nalder, Jr. did not 
think that defendant had displayed a threatening attitude 
for he voiced his understanding in language the exact 
opposite of such a situation. (Ex. uF-16") Furthermore, 
he states that his father had told him the exact opposite ·of 
what his parents testified to at the trial. (Tr. 156) In-
stead of making threats defendant made repeated offers to 
give any company willing to finance plaintiffs a subordina-
tion of its claim provided plaintiffs in return would ac-
count for and pay $3 52.00 which was the sum plaintiffs 
had received from the sale of turkeys illegally sold in vio-
lation of the terms of the 1951 chattel mortgage. (Tr. 
115-17, 135, 195, Ex. ((F-16-25," 3, ((G-2") The plaintiffs 
recognized their obligation to make this accounting and 
attempted to comply. 
In their testimony at the trial plaintiffs contended 
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that they had the facilities and intended to raise 14,000 
turkeys each year for 1952, 1953 and 1954 had financing 
been available to enable them to do so. It is of utmost 
importance to point out that notwithstanding such claims 
in the prior years of 1949, 1950 and 1951, their operation 
had never exceeded 6,000 birds and they never, at any 
time, raised or marketed more than that number. (Tr. 81, 
27, 33; Ex. uD") Furthermore, in the years 1950 and 
195'1 they had exactly the same facilities available to them 
as were available in 1952, 1953 and 1954 when both of 
them working together never exceeded 6,000 birds in their 
joint operation. (Tr. 18, 50, 60, 48, 132 and 153) 
During the trial the matter of the efforts of plaintiffs 
to secure other financing for 1952, 1953 and 1954, after 
defendant refused to extend further credit at the end of 
1951, was testified to at great length. Several applications 
made by either Nalder, Jr. or Nalder, Sr. were introduced 
and received in evidence. (Exs. uG", uH", ui" and HQ") 
None of these applications received favorable action and 
no credits were advanced under them. Plaintiffs contend 
that they were never able to find out the reasons for the 
rejection of their applications until just prior to the time 
this action was brought when they finally learned that the 
mortgages described in their complaint were unreleased. 
(Tr. 76-7, 102, 158-9, 163-4, 180) They asserted that 
they had been led to believe all of those mortgages had 
been released but finally conceded on cross examination 
that since the debt represented by the real estate mortgage 
(Ex. uC-9") had never been paid they were not entitled 
to a release of that particular mortgage. (Tr. 108, 164) 
With respect to all other mortgages, both chattel and real 
estate, they asserted they were entitled to releases either be-
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cause of promises made by the defendant or because the 
sums advanced had been repaid. The record does not sup-
port plaintiffs' contention and especially with respect to 
the real estate mortgages of April and August, 1950 (Exs. 
uC-3" and ((C-9") because both mortgages expressly pro-
vided that they were to secure all indebtedness then exist-
ing or accruing thereafter by all the plaintiffs to defendant 
until the same was paid in full. The indebtedness repre-
sented by these mortgages was never in fact paid. These 
two real estate mortgages totaled on their face the sum 
of $13,276.92. 
In testifying concerning the execution and delivery 
of the real estate mortgage of August 15, 1950 (Ex. 
uC-9") Nalder, Sr. made the statement that it was given 
to defendant with the promise that the chattel mortgage 
for 1949 (Ex. ((A -1 ") would be released. This promise 
on defendant's behalf was attributed to a salesman in de-
fendant's employ, and testified to over the repeated and 
strenuous objections of defendant as to its competency. 
There was no evidence of authority or agency in said sales-
man to make such a promise. Furthermore, the undisput-
ed record is to the effect that he had no such authority. 
(Ex. ttY", Tr. 217, 256-8, 263-5) 
Plaintiffs further contended that they were entitled 
to and promised releases of the chattel mortgages for 1950 
and 1951. (Exs. nA-2", ((A-3") No such promise was 
ever made or if made there was no showing that it was 
binding on defendant. (Ex. ((E-5" and ((E-6") Defendant, 
in retaining all of the mortgages of record, was acting upon 
the instruction and advice of counsel not to release any 
mortgages so long as prior existing indebtedness was not 
paid for the reason that in the opinion of such counsel 
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defendant would be jeopardizing its rights by doing s<J. 
(Tr. 211-12, 266, 270) 
At the very time that plaintiffs contend their busi-
ness was being harmed by defendant's unreleased mort-
gages, the record is without dispute that in addition to the 
real estate mortgages held by defendant (Ex. uC-3" and 
uC-9") totaling $13,276.92, Nalder, Sr. had a real estate 
mortgage for $9,000.00 on the same property described 
in defendant's mortgage with Deseret Federal Savings & 
Loan Association which was of record in Davis County, 
Utah. (Exs. uH" and uQ") And at the same time there 
was of record in the same county against Nalder, Jr. a real 
estate mortgage for $2,500.00 and a chattel mortgage for 
$2,500.00 (Ex. ul"). These various mortgages totaled 
$27,276.69. 
Furthermore, there is evidence in the record that the 
plaintiffs were regarded as poor financial risks. (Ex. 
ul-6") In addition there was no evidence offered to show 
that defendant's various applications would have been 
accepted even though all defendant's mortgages had been 
released. (Tr. 243, 246, 249-51) 
Finally, no demand for release of real estate mort-
gages was ever made by plaintiffs and no demand for the 
release of chattel mortgages was made until the end of 
1953 or early 1954. (Ex. uJ-3", Tr. 104, 106, 140-43, 
113, 16 3, 179, 18 2) The chattel mortgages were all re-
leased on March 11, 1954. (Ex. uB-1", uB-2" and HB-3") 
During the trial numerous objections to the introduc-
tion of evidence and the propriety of counsel's questions 
were raised to no avail. These matters will be referred 
to and argued hereafter. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point 1 
IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE PLAIN-
riFF, CATHERINE NALDER, THE TRIAL COURT 
:::OMMITTED ERROR BECAUSE THE UNDISPUT-
~D EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT SAID PLAIN-
riFF HAD NO INTEREST IN THE BUSINESS 
:::LAIMED TO HAVE BEEN INJURED BY THE ACT 
JF DEFENDANT. 
Point 2 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
!\WARDING DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF, H. WIL-
LIAM NALDER, JR. FOR DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED 
WRONGFUL FAILURE TO RELEASE REAL 
ESTATE MORTGAGES TO WHICH HE WAS NEV-
ER A PARTY. 
Point 3 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN DOUBLE THE AMOUNT 
OF ACTUAL DAMAGES FOUND BY HIM TO HAVE 
BEEN SUSTAINED BY PLAINTIFFS BECAUSE OF 
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED WRONGFUL FAILURE 
:)R REFUSAL TO RELEASE CHATTEL MORT-
GAGES AND ERRED FURTHER IN AWARDING 
DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF, CATHERINE NALDER, 
FOR DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO RELEASE SUCH 
MORTGAGES. 
Point 4 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
!\WARDING DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS BECAUSE 
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OF DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED FAILURE OR RE 
FUSAL TO RELEASE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE~ 
BECAUSE NO DEMAND OR REQUEST FOR SUCf. 
RELEASES WAS EVER MADE, AND FOR THE AD-
DITIONAL REASON THAT PLAINTIFFS NEVER 
PAID OR OTHERWISE DISCHARGED THE OBLI-
GATION SECURED BY SAID MORTGAGES. 
Point 5 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
AWARDING DAMAGES FOR THE ALLEGED 
WRONGFUL FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO RE-
LEASE CHATTEL MORTGAGES: 
(A) BECAUSE NO DEMAND FOR THE RE-
LEASE OF SUCH MORTGAGES WAS MADE UNTIL 
THE END OF 1953 OR EARLY 1954, AND 
(B) BECAUSE EACH CHATTEL MORTGAGE 
SECURED THE PRIOR UNPAID DEBT OF PLAIN-
TIFFS, H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR. AND JR. WHICH 
WAS NOT PAID, HENCE NO RELEASE COULD BE 
DEMANDED, AND 
(C) BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE FROM 
WHICH IT WOULD APPEAR THAT PLAINTIFFS, 
H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR. AND JR. COULD NOT 
HAVE SECURED 1954 FINANCING AFTER RE-
LEASE OF SAID MORTGAGES WAS DELIVERED 
BY DEFENDANT ABOUT MARCH 11, 1954. 
Point 6 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
APPLYING AN IMPROPER RULE OF DAMAGES TO 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF LOSS OF ANTICIPATED 
PROFITS FOR THE YEARS 1952, 1953 AND 1954. 
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Point 7 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
RECEIVING IN EVIDENCE, OVER DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTION, PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBITS tcM," HN'' 
AND uo" FOR THE REASON THAT SAID EXHIB-
ITS WERE INCOMPETENT, IRRELEVANT AND 
IMMATERIAL TO ESTABLISH PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM 
OF LOST PROFITS. 
Point 8 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE THERE IS NO COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT'S FAILURE OR RE-
FUSAL TO RELEASE EITHER ITS REAL ESTATE 
OR CHATTEL MORTGAGES WAS THE PROXI-
MATE CAUSE OF ANY LOSS TO PLAINTIFFS, H. 
WILLIAM NALDER, SR., AND JR. 
• Point 9 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE CONCLU-
SIVELY ESTABLISHES THAT DEFENDANT ACT-
ED IN GOOD FAITH. 
Point 10 
TI-IE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OVER DEFEND-
ANT'S OBJECTIONS THAT SCOVILLE, EREKSON 
AND SCHINKER PROMISED OR AGREED ON BE-
HALF OF DEFENDANT TO RELEASE MORTGAGES 
WITH NO PRELIMINARY SHOWING OF AGENCY 
OR AUTHORITY OF SAID PERSONS TO MAKE 
SUCH PROMISES, AND FOR THE FURTHER REA-
SON THAT UNCONTROVERTED TESTIMONY 
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ESTABLISHES THAT SAID PERSONS HAD NO 
SUCH AUTHORITY. 
Point 11 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE ADMIS-
SION OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND IN NUMER-
OUS RULINGS ON OBJECTIONS TO LEADING 
AND OTHER IMPROPER QUESTIONS PRO-
POUNDED BY COUNSEL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE PLAIN-
TIFF, CATHERINE NALDER, THE TRIAL COURT 
COMMITTED ERROR BECAUSE THE UNDISPUT-
ED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT SAID PLAIN-
TIFF HAD NO INTEREST IN THE BUSINESS 
CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN INJURED BY THE ACT 
OF DEFENDANT. 
The whole theory of plaintiffs' case rests upon the 
proposition that a business was damaged because of a fail-
ure of defendant to release the mortgages described in 
plaintiffs' complaint. It should require no citation of 
authority to support the contention that before such dam-
age could ever be recovered it would have to be first shown 
that the party claiming such damage owned an interest 
in the business claimed to have been injured. Notwith-
standing such elementary requirement, the trial court not 
only proceeded to award to the plaintiff, Catherine Nald-
er, such damages without proof of her ownership of an in-
terest therein, but even more startling awarded her dam-
ages in the face of her husband's testimony that the busi-
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ness in question belonged to him and his son exclusively. 
(Tr. 16-17) That this is true is apparent from the fact 
that Mrs. Nalder never signed any of the chattel mort-
gages involved in this case or the turkey finince contracts 
which were a part of each transaction between defendant 
and plaintiffs, H. William Nalder, Sr. and Jr. (Exs. teA-l", 
HA-2", tcA-3") 
We shall cite cases hereinafter which clearly rule that 
before damages for loss of future or anticipated profits 
may be recovered, it must be shown that such a business 
is in existence and is well established. To award damages 
for injury to property not belonging to the claimant is 
so palpably erroneous that such judgment cannot possibly 
stand. 
POINT 2 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
AWARDING DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF, H. WIL-
LIAM NALDER, JR. FOR DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED 
WRONGFUL FAILURE TO RELEASE REAL ESTATE 
MORTGAGES TO WHICH HE WAS NEVER A 
PARTY. 
Sec. 57-3-8, UCA 1953, is a highly penal statute pro-
viding that a mortgagee shall be liable to a mortgagor for 
double the amount of actual damage sustained by him · 
because of the mortgagee's failure to discharge or release 
a real estate mortgage after the same has been fully satis-
fied. That statute was the basis of an award of $48,767.40 
actual damages, plus an equal amount of punitive damages 
to the plaintiff, H. William Nalder, Jr., upon the ground 
that defendant did not release certain real estate mort-
gages executed and delivered to defendant by plaintiffs, 
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H. William Nalder, Sr. and his wife. It will be observed 
that the statute is explicit in its terms in allowing such 
damages only to a mortgagor. The record in this case 
shows upon its face that plaintiff, H. William Nalder, Jr. 
did not execute any of the real estate mortgages described 
in plaintiffs' complaint and was therefore not a mortgagor. 
There is no evidence in the record from which the 
trial court could possibly find whether damages, if any, 
flowed from the failure to release the real estate mortgages 
or from the failure to release chattel mortgages. And the 
trial court made no finding whatsoever upon this vital 
aspect of the case. If damage flowed from the real estate 
mortgages, then H. William Nalder, Jr. could be awarded 
nothing because he was never a mortgagor in any real 
estate mortgage. On the other hand if damage flowed 
only partly from defendant's failure to release real estate 
mortgages and partly from its failure to release chattel 
mortgages, there is nothing in the record from which a 
determination can be made as to how much flowed from 
each cause. The trial court made no attempt to segregate 
or separate the damages either as to the cause or to appor-
tion the damages between the plaintiffs. This omission 
is fatal to the affirmance of the judgment which was ren-
dered. 
It is earnestly submitted that the action of the trial 
court was a flagrant violation of defendant's rights and 
demands the reversal of the judgment rendered. By his 
intemperate and ill-considered judgment, the trial court 
awarded damages (1) to Catherine Nalder, who was en-
titled to no damages at all, and (2) awarded punitive dam-
ages to H. William N alder, Jr. for an alleged act of de-
fendant for which he was not entitled to invoke the 
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statute relied upon to support this judgment, and ( 3) 
made no proper finding as to the cause of plaintiff's dam-
age. 
POINT 3 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN DOUBLE THE AMOUNT 
OF ACTUAL DAMAGES FOUND BY HIM TO HAVE 
BEEN SUSTAINED BY PLAINTIFFS BECAUSE OF 
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED WRONGFUL FAILURE 
OR REFUSAL TO RELEASE CHATTEL MORT-
GAGES AND ERRED FURTHER IN AWARDING 
DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF, CATHERINE NALDER, 
FOR DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO RELEASE SUCH 
MORTGAGES. 
Notwithstanding plaintiffs did not invoke the provis-
ions of Sec. 9-1-4, UCA 1953 in their complaint which 
provides a penalty against a chattel mortgagee, who, after 
demand, refuses to release a chattel mortgage which has 
been fully performed by the mortgagor, plaintiffs never-
theless grounded their claim to damages against defend-
ant upon that statute as well as upon Sec. 57-3-8, supra. 
Under Sec. 9-1-4, supra, a different rule of damages ap-
plies than governs the case of an unreleased real estate 
mortgage. Under the first statute, punitive damages are 
limited to $50.00. 
In addition to the error of awarding damages to Mrs. 
Nalder upon the ground of defendant's failure to release 
both real estate and chattel mortgages, to which she was 
plainly not entitled, as hereinbefore pointed out, the error 
was further compounded when an award of double dam-
age was made to all plaintiffs, for the failure of defendant 
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to release chattel mortgages. In his findings the trial court 
determined that damage was caused by defendant's failure 
to release usatis:fied" mortgages. This clearly implies dam-
age from chattel mortgages. How much of the damage 
arose from this cause we are left utterly in the dark to 
speculate upon. But whatever the damage from such 
cause, the trial court was not at liberty to double the 
amount arising from that cause. Thus, the trial court 
applied the penal provisions of the statute governing real 
estate mortgages in favor of all plaintiffs, and ignored en-
tirely the rule of damages applicable to chattel mortgages. 
Furthermore, the remedies of Sec. 9-1-4 are available only 
to a mortgagor but those remedies were applied to award 
damages to Mrs. Nalder who was not a chattel mortgagor. 
These errors are of such basic importance that their com-
mission vitiates the judgment regardless of any meritori-
ous characteristics which it might otherwise possess. 
POINT 4 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
AWARDING DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS BECAUSE 
OF DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED FAILURE OR REFUS-
AL TO RELEASE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES BE-
CAUSE NO DEMAND OR REQUEST FOR SUCH RE-
LEASES WAS EVER MADE, AND FOR THE ADDI-
TIONAL REASON THAT PLAINTIFFS NEVER 
PAID OR OTHERWISE DISCHARGED THE OBLI-
GATION SECURED BY SAID MORTGAGES. 
In 56 A.L.R. at page 337 it is stated: 
uA notice or request to the mortgagee that he 
enter a satisfaction or execute a release of the mort-
gage is a condition precedent to a right of action 
for the penalty." (Citing cases) 
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In the record now before the court there is no evidence 
that defendant was ever requested by the plaintiffs to re-
lease its real estate mortgages. In fact, no such demand was 
ever made by plaintiffs. The cases are well settled on the 
proposition that such a demand must be made. See 56 
A.L.R. 337 supra. See also Interna.tional Harvester Co. 
v. Simpson, (Ala.,) 13 3 So. 4, applying this rule to chattel 
mortgages. 
Statutes of the kind similar to 57-3-8, UCA, 
1953, relied upon by plaintiffs, are highly penal in charac-
ter and are to be strictly construed. The courts are prac-
tically unanimous in their reluctance or refusal to enforce 
such statutes until mortgagees have had every reasonable 
opportunity to comply with their provisions. This court 
has construed the Utah statute in the case of Shibata v. 
Bear River State Bank, 115 Utah 395, 205 P. 2d 251, and 
has held that the section is penal and must be strictly con-
strued. 
A fact of even greater significance, which the trial 
court totally ignored, is that the record shows that the 
real estate mortgages of August 1 and August 15, 1950 
(Exs. ((C-3" and ((C-9") were never satisfied, hence plain-
tiffs at no time had a right to demand releases. In both 
mortgages referred to, this provision was inserted: 
((In addition to the foregoing amount of 
$6,721.80 ($6,555.12) this mortgage shall secure 
all other sums due and to become due from H. Wil-
liam Nalder, Sr. and Catherine Nalder, his wife, 
and H. William Nalder, Jr., and Mrs. H. William 
Nalder, Jr., his wife, in favor of Kellogg Sales 
Company." 
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At the time these mortgages were executed, plaintiffs, H. 
William Nalder, Sr. and Jr. were indebted to defendant 
for the amount recited in said mortgages. It should, there-
fore, be evident that by the express terms of these mort-
gages the plaintiffs could not require a release until all in-
debtedness owing to the defendant had been paid in full. 
Never, at any time, have the plaintiffs attempted to deny 
that they owed the amount recited in these mortgages and 
the trial court so found. (See Finding #9, R. 23) The 
N alders themselves recognized the validity of those mort-
gages and admitted the right of the defendant to retain 
them of record. (Tr. 108, 164) In addition, the 1949 real 
estate mortgage was never satisfied because the debt owing, 
which was secured in part by that mortgage, was never 
paid. Hence, the plaintiffs were not entitled to demand 
its release. It must, therefore, be apparent that the judg-
ment awarded by the court for the failure to release real 
estate mortgages cannot stand, because the conditions 
which would have entitled the plaintiffs to the relief un-
der the statutes relied upon did not exist. 
POINT 5 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
AWARDING DAMAGES FOR THE ALLEGED 
WRONGFUL FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO RE-
LEASE CHATTEL MORTGAGES: 
(A) BECAUSE NO DEMAND FOR THE RE-
LEASE OF SUCH MORTGAGES WAS MADE UNTIL 
THE END OF 1953 OR EARLY 1954, AND 
(B) BECAUSE EACH CHATTEL MORTGAGE 
SECURED THE PRIOR UNPAID DEBT OF PLAIN-
TIFFS, H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR. AND JR. WHICH 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
WAS NOT PAID, HENCE NO RELEASE COULD BE 
DEMANDED, AND 
(C) BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE FROM 
WHICH IT WOULD APPEAR THAT PLAINTIFFS, 
H. \VILLIAM NALDER, SR. AND JR. COULD NOT 
HAVE SECURED 1954 FINANCING AFTER RE-
LEASE OF SAID MORTGAGES WAS DELIVERED BY 
DEFENDANT ABOUT MARCH 11, 1954. 
Section 9-1-4, UCA, 1953, provides: 
((After the full performance of the conditions 
of the mortgage any mortgagee, agent, assignee or 
legal representative who shall willfully neglect, for 
the space of ten days after being requested, to dis-
charge the same shall be liable to the mortgagor or 
his assigns in the sum of $50 punitive damages and 
also for all actual damages sustained by such neglect 
or refusal." 
The record in this connection is without dispute that no 
demand was ever made for the release of chattel mortgages 
until the end of 1953 or early 1954. By the unequivocal 
terms of the statute which this court has said, in ruling 
upon the companion statute, requires strict construction, 
there can be no penalty assessed for failure to release until 
after demand. Shibata v. Bear River State Bank, supra. 
Notwithstanding this fact, the trial court awarded to the 
plaintiffs a judgment for purported loss of profits sus-
tained in 1952 and 1953, which losses, if sustained at all, 
were suffered prior to any demand for a release having 
been made. It must be apparent, therefore, that the judg-
ment in this respect is fatally defective. 
Releases of chattel mortgages were executed on the 
21st of January, 1954, and were recorded in the office 
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of the Clerk of Davis County, Utah, March 11, 1954. 
(Ex. ((B") It is submitted that there is no evidence that 
these plaintiffs sustained any damage for failure to release 
these chattel mortgages between the time when the de-
mand was made and the time when the releases were 
placed of record. The releases were filed before the begin-
ning of the 1954 turkey season and there is no scintilla of 
evidence by which it was shown that they were not re-
leased in time for the plaintiffs, in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, to have secured financing for their 1954 oper-
ations. The record shows (Ex. uW") that the plaintiffs 
1951 turkey poults were not delivered until April 3, May 
4, and May 11, 1951 respectively, and Exhibit uD-1" 
shows that the turkeys raised in 19'49 were not 
hatched until April 29, 1949, and Exhibit uD-3" shows 
that the turkeys raised that year were hatched March 1 
and May 7 respectively, and Exhibit uD-5" shows that 
the turkeys raised in 19 51 were hatched March 9 and 
May 10 respectively, and Exhibit up" shows that in 1953 
the N alders started on April 3, 19 53. Furthermore, as-
suming that there is any liability for the failure to release 
chattel mortgages in relation to damages claimed for 1954, 
in the absence of evidence to show that damage was act-
ually sustained by reason of that fact, the awarded dam-
ages could not in any event exceed $50.00. 
In the face of what has just been pointed out, the trial 
court awarded these plaintiffs its judgment for alleged 
losses in 1954 of $10,116.00 and assessed a like amount as 
a penalty. Each of the chattel mortgages under consider-
ation contained this provision: 
((Provided that if the mortgagor shall pay or 
cause to be paid unto Kellogg Sales Company or 
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its assigns the indebtedness above set forth on de-
mand as evidenced by his note or notes, together 
with interest as therein provided and shall further 
pay or cause to be paid such other further and fu-
ture indebtedness whether evidenced by promis-
sory note or not as the mortgagor may hereafter 
incur to the mortgagee, it being the intent hereof 
to secure the said mortgagee any advance or credit 
now made or hereafter made * * * or any other 
advancement or credits extended * * ::- ." 
Thus, by the very terms of these chattel mortgages they 
were given to secure existing indebtedness no matter how 
originating. It is undisputed in the record that there was 
unpaid indebtedness going back to the inception of the 
business relationship between the parties. The law is well 
settled that taking a new chattel mortgage in the absence 
of intent does not satisfy a pre-existing indebtedness. 
Pacific Nat. Ag. Credit Corp. v. Wilbur, Cal. 42 P. 2d 314: 
((The acceptance of the new note and mort-
gage as a renewal of the former note and mortgage 
in the absence of evidence of any agreement that 
the new note and mortgage should be accepted in 
payment and satisfaction of the old does not op-
erate as an extinguishment or discharge of the lat-
ter." 
McGown vs. Fuller, (Wyo.) 266 Pac. 124 involved a whole 
series of chattel mortgages given over a period of many 
years, and the Supreme Court of Wyoming held in that 
case that each new mortgage was a renewal or continuation 
of the previous one and was intended to secure the original 
debt which was never paid, even though the amount var-
ied from time to time. Likewise, see Lupe Discount Corp. 
v. Holleb f3 Co., (Ill.) 47 N.E. 2d. at 337. 
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It is the position and contention of defendant that 
each new chattel mortgage taken by it included the past 
due and unpaid debt of Nalder, Sr. and Jr., and that con-
sequently no right to demand a release of any chattel mort-
gage existed, even assuming that a proper demand for re-
lease was made, until the debt secured by those mortgages 
was paid in full, including the amount still unpaid from the 
1949 operations of the mortgagors. Certainly, in view of 
the record, there never existed any right to a release of the 
1949 chattel mortgage and we contend the same construc-
tion must be applied to the chattel mortgages given in 
1950 and 1951 as well. Plaintiffs attempted to escape the 
consequences of their failure to pay the amount due under 
the 1949 chattel mortgage by contending that defendant 
promised in exchange for their agreement to execute the 
real estate mortgage of August 15, 1950 (Ex. HC-9) that 
the 1949 chattel mortgage would be released. Defendant 
denied any such agreement and we shall discuss under an-
other heading of this brief why plaintiff's contention is 
untenable. Plaintiffs knew that defendant did not accept 
this real estate mortgage in payment and discharge of the 
1949 chattel mortgage. (Tr. 24) 
POINT 6 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
APPLYING AN IMPROPER RULE OF DAMAGES 
TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF LOSS OF ANTICI-
PATED PROFITS FOR THE YEARS 1952, 1953 AND 
1954. 
In order to sustain a judgment in their favor, the 
plaintiffs were required to show that as a result of de-
fendant's wrongful conduct they sustained damage. They 
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contended that this damage was in loss of profits during 
the years 1952, 1953 and 1954, after the defendant de-
clined to furnish any further financing of their operations, 
and as they stoutly contend, resulted because defendant's 
mortgages prevented them from obtaining financing else-
where. Loss of profits, like any other damage, must be 
proven before any recovery may be had for such a loss. 
The same rules of certainty and definiteness apply to fu-
ture profits as apply to any other type of damage. Also, 
conjecture, speculation and guessing are as objectionable 
in proving such losses as they would be in any claim for 
damages. 
It is conceded that a loss of future or anticipated prof-
its due either to breach of contract or tort may be recov-
ered in an action for damages. The following authorities 
are in accord with this rule: 
States v. Durkin, (Kan.) 68. Pac. 1091. 
Schultz v. Wells Butchers' Supply, (Wash.) 
275 Pac. 737. 
Outcault Advertising Co. v. Citizens' Nat. 
Bank of E1nporia, (Kan.) 234 Pac. 988. 
However, that does not permit the claimant to recover 
such a loss by merely claiming that except for the inter-
ference of defendant his profits would have been so much 
money. He must establish a basis for his claim in order to 
recover. The requirement is that of proof with reason-
able certainty. 
Claims for loss of anticipated or future profits by 
their very nature are speculative and uncertain. The gen-
eral rule applicable to damages is that damages in order 
to be recoverable must be certain. The rule is stated in the 
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 912 as follows: 
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~~A person to whom another has tortiously 
caused harm is entitled to compensatory damages 
therefor if, but only if, he establishes by proof the 
extent of such harm and the amount of money 
representing adequate compensation with such cer-
tainty as the nature of the tort and the circum-
stances permit." 
The rule is further stated in the case of Steiner v. Long 
Beach Local No. 128, (Cal.) 123 P. 2d 20, page 27 as fol-
lows: 
((Generally speaking, the principle underlying 
the right to damages for injury is that the person 
injured is entitled to compensation commensurate 
with his loss. It is not sufficient to prove the in-
fringement of a legal right; to recover more than 
merely nominal damages, the injured person must 
prove the amount or items of the damage suffered 
by them. As stated in 25 C.J.S., Damages, Sec. 144, 
P. 788, ~As noted in Sec. 6 supra, a presumption of 
at least nominal damage follows from proof of a 
legal wrong. However, the amount and items of 
pecuniary damage are not presumed, but must be 
proved; and if there is no evidence as to the ex-
tent of the pecuniary loss there can be no recovery 
of substantial damages, at least where the elements 
of damage are such as to be susceptible of pecuniary 
admeasurement.' The rule is applicable to a tortious 
interference with a business::- * * ." 
And in Grupe v. Glick, (Cal.) 160 P. 2d 832, the following 
is stated: 
((An award of damages for the detriment oc-
casioned by the loss of future profits is subject to 
the general rule that the amount which, except for 
the defendant's wrongful act, would have come to 
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the plaintiff, must be certain and must have been 
within the contemplation of the parties when they 
contracted." 
In the abstract opinion to Blakely Printing Co. v. Fort 
Dearborn Mercantile Co., (Ill.) 53 N.E. 2d at page 55, the 
headnotes are as follows: 
ttln action for breach of contract, a party seek-
ing damages for loss of profits must show reality 
of loss and that breach was proximate cause there-
of." 
And in Krikorian v. Dailey, (Va.) 197 S.E. 442 at page 
448, the rule is stated thus: 
((Profits may only be recovered where they can 
be ascertained with reasonable certainty." 
The above cases amply demonstrate that even in cases in-
volving loss of future profits the rule of certainty must 
be met to sustain a judgment for damages. Defendant con-
cedes that with the proper proof recovery can be obtained 
for the loss of such profits. Even though in such cases cer-
tain elements of speculation and uncertainty exist, the 
courts will permit a recovery in spite of such uncertainty 
if, but only if, some reasonable formula or basis is sustained 
upon which recovery may rest. Succinctly stated, the rule 
applying to such cases is that any loss of future profits 
must be related to the experience of the claimant prior to 
the time of the commission of the wrongful act. The rule 
is stated in the Restatement of Torts, Sec. 912, page 578 
as follows: 
ttAs a condition to recovery for loss of earn-
ings, the person harmed must offer evidence, con-
vincing to the trier of fact, that a substantial 
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amount of earnings has been lost. To do this he 
must introduce evidence of the amount of earn-
ings received prior to the time of the injury, or the 
amount which he was capable of obtaining, and at 
least some evidence having a tendency to show that 
he could have earned something during the period 
in which loss of earnings is claimed." 
And with respect to the same rules of law applicable to 
loss of profits resulting from breach of contract, the Re-
statement on Contracts, Sec. 331, P. 515 states the rule as 
follows: 
uDamages are recoverable for losses caused or 
for profits and other gains prevented by the breach 
only to the extent that the evidence affords a suf-
ficient basis for estimating their amount in money 
with reasonable certainty." 
A leading case on this subject decided by the Supreme 
Court of Oregon is Willia111s v. Island City Mercantile f5 
Milling Co. 3 7 Pac. 49. That case involved a claim for 
loss of future profits growing out of breach of contract. 
That court stated the following in the course of its opin-
IOn: 
uw e are aware the authorities are not uniform 
on this question but it seems to us the rule we have 
indicated is more likely to do justice between the 
parties to this record than the one adopted by the 
trial court. The anticipated or expected profits 
from the operation of a flouring mill are pro-
verbially uncertain and contingent, and to allow 
them, as such, to be recovered as damages in an 
action for a breach of contract to furnish machin-
ery and appliances for such mill is to allow the jury 
to enter into the realm of speculation and uncer-
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tainty. As said by Mr. Justice Cooley in Allis v. 
McLean, supra, a case similar to the one at bar: 
(Estimates of profits seldom take all contingencies 
into the account, and are therefore seldom realized; 
and, if damages for breach of contract were to be 
determined on estimates of probable profits, no 
man could know in advance the extent of his re-
sponsibility. It is therefore very properly held, in 
cases like the present, that the party complaining 
·of a breach of contract must point out elements of 
damage more certain and more directly traceable 
to the injury than prospective profits can be'::-::-::-." 
uw e are of the opinion, therefore, that the 
true measure of damages for the failure to complete 
the contract within the time stipulated, and for 
the loss of time occasioned by the attempts of the 
plaintiffs, after September 20th, to comply with 
the terms of their contract, is the reasonable value 
of the use of the mill during such time, as ascer-
tained from the past experience of the defendant. 
::- ::- ::- The ruling announced by the court as to the 
measure of damages for the difference between the 
actual and guaranteed capacity of the mill was, we 
think, correct, beca.use it was based upon past trans-
actions; and it is a mere matter of mathematical 
calculation to determine the difference between the 
actual output of a 45 barrel capacity mill and what 
the output would have been during the same time, 
had the mill been up to the guarantied capacity." 
And in the case of Chain Belt Co. v. U. S., (United 
States Court Claims), 115 F. Supp. 701, a quotation is 
made from the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Sec-
tion 3 3 1 ( 2 ) (d) : 
ulf the defendant's breach has prevented the 
plaintiff from carrying on a well established busi-
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ness, the amount of profits thereby prevented is 
often capable of proof with reasonable certainty. 
On the basis of its past history, a reasonable predic-
tion can be made as to its future." 
The same section quoted from the Restatement of Con-
tracts quoted above is reiterated. 
And in the case of William H. Rankin Co. v. Associ-
ated Bill Posters of the United States, 42 Fed. 2d 152, the 
recovery of such damages was permitted upon the testi-
mony of the treasurer of the plaintiff comparing the busi-
ness net profits in one year with the treasurer's knowledge 
of business conditions when the company was free from 
unlawful interference and from this the plaintiffs' prob-
able yearly earnings was estimated. In Shell Oil Co. v. 
State Tire & Oil Co., 126 Fed. 2d 971, it was held that the 
jury could consider evidence concerning the plaintiff's 
profits for a reasonable time before any wrongful conduct 
by the defendant and compare those profits with reduced 
profits or losses ensuing as a direct result of the wrongful 
action of defendant. 
This court in the case of Jenkins v. Morgan-Vt.-, 
260 Pac. 2d 532 at page 535 quotes with approval the case 
of Carolene Sales Co. v. Canyon Milk Products Co., 122 
Wash. 220,210 Pac. 366, 367, as follows: 
tt:=- * * before special damages for loss of profits 
to a general business occasioned by the wrongful 
acts of another may be recovered, it must be made 
to appear that the business had been in successful 
operation for such a period of time as to give it 
permanency and recognition, and that such busi-
ness was earning a profit which could be reasonably 
ascertained and approximated." 
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In U. S. v. Griffith, Gornall 5 Carman, Inc., (lOth 
Circuit), 210 Fed. 2d 11, the Circuit Court of Appeals 
said: 
HThe loss of future profits from a regularly 
established business may in proper cases be estab-
lished by showing that the profits after the wrong 
are less than past profits. 25 C.J.S. Damages, Sec. 90 
(citing other cases) ::· ::- *." 
((Mathematical exactness as to the amount is 
not required but the evidence must form a basis 
for a reasonable approximation. The court must 
have before it such facts and circumstances to 
enable it to make an estimate of damage based upon 
judgment, not guesswork. Palmer v. Connecticut 
Ry. & Lighting Co., supra. (Actual damages only 
may be secured. Those that are speculative, re-
mote, uncertain, may not form the basis of a law-
ful judgment. The actual damages which will sus-
tain a judgment must be established, not by con-
jectures or unwarranted estimates of witnesses, but 
by facts from which their existence is logically and 
legally inferable. The speculations, guesses, esti-
mates of witnesses, form no better basis of recovery 
than the speculations of the jury themselves.'" 
Turning now from this array of authorities to the 
facts in this case, what do we find? The evidence is un-
disputed that in the years prior to 1952, when there was 
no interference from the defendant and when in fact the 
defendant was financing the plaintiffs to the full extent 
of their operations, their business was a failure. We quote 
from the plaintiffs' own statements regarding their busi-
ness operations. On November 21, 19 51, they wrote de-
fendant as follows: 
tt* * ~~- It surely looks bad for us again ::- :z. * 
You also know without me telling you, that we 
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have made nothing since we went into the tur-
keys* ::· ::·. 
((If we had sold them here when processed we 
would have been able to pay Kellogg all we owed 
him and had $800.00 over, but as it was we went 
$6,000.00 in the hole. ::· * :-'" 
((The next year (last year) we were able to 
pay Kellogg Company all of last year's bill and 
$1,000.00 on interest. 
((Mr. Williams, this year the way we had to 
feed was also a very costly lesson to us. Our feed 
bill this year will be more than $6,000.00 above 
what it was last year :-'" * ::· ." (Ex. ((F-4") 
Again on April 5, 1952 they wrote the defendant as fol-
lows: 
tt::. :~o ::· You may say rightly that they have not 
been good years::· * ::· ." (Ex. ((F-21") 
In those three years they were unable to pay off the 1949 
debt owing to the defendant. Did they show as this 
court in ] enkins v. Morgan, supra, states they must show 
((that the business had been in successful operation for 
such a period of time as to give it permanency and recog-
nition, and that such business was earning a profit which 
could be reasonably ascertained and approximated?" It 
is certain that the record shows exactly the opposite. The 
turkey raising business, to para phrase the case of Williams 
v. Island City Mercantile f5 Milling Co., supra, is even 
more speculative than the milling business and to permit 
these plaintiffs to come into court and to testify that in 
1952, 1953 and 1954 they would have raised 14,000 tur-
keys and marketed the same at so much profit per bird 
was the purest kind of speculation and was in no way re-
lated to their past experience of earnings. It is consequent-
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ly submitted that the judgment rendered cannot stand or 
be sustained and the same should be reversed. 
Furthermore, the rule is that there can be no dam-
ages recovered for anticipated or future profits to be de-
rived from a business only in contemplation in the owner's 
mind or which is unestablished. In Jenkins v. Morgan, 
supra, this court stated: 
((All the authorities are unanimous in holding 
that prospective profits to be derived from a busi-
ness which is not yet established but one merely in 
contemplation are generally too uncertain and 
speculative to form a basis for recovery." 
And the same rule is announced in the Chain Belt Co. v. 
United States, supra, in this language: 
((Anticipated profits from a business which is 
contemplated but not established are too remote 
and speculative to form a basis on which to recover 
for damages for the reason that there are no facts 
from which the amounts of the proceeds can be 
determined by the degree of certainty required by 
law." 
And to the same effect see Grupe v. Glick, supra, where the 
court says: 
((On the other hand, where the operation of 
an unestablished business is prevented or inter-
rupted, damages for prospective profits that might 
otherwise have been made from its operation are 
not recoverable for the reason that their occurrence 
is uncertain, contingent and speculative." 
And quoting further: 
((For the reason that Grupe's exclusive sales 
agency was a new venture, the record does not 
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contain any evidence of a past volume of business 
in the sale of the particular machine in contro-
versy, showing with reasonable probability that a 
fairly certain number of additional sales could have 
been made in the future." 
And in Krikorian v. Dailey, supra, the court announced 
this rule: 
cclf the business is new and without back-
ground, there is no base from which profits may be 
determined ::- * ::- ." 
And in Steiner v. Long Beach Local No. 12 8, supra, the 
California court said the following: 
ccWhere an established business is wrongfully 
interrupted and injured, the proper measure of 
damages is the diminution in value of business 
traceable to the wrongful act as reflected by loss 
of profits, expenses incurred, or similar concrete 
evidences of injury." 
See following cases and authorities: 
15 Am. Juris. page 573, Sec. 157. 
25 Corpus Juris Secundum, P. 518, Sec. 42 (b). 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. So. Photo Material Co., 
295 Fed. 98. 
Ellerson v. Grove, Circuit Court of Appeals, 
4th Circuit, 44 Fed. 2d 493. 
770. 
263. 
Andreopulos v. Peresteredes, (Wash.) 163 Pac. 
Goebel v. Haugh, 2 N.W. 847, (Minn.) 
Blankenship v. Lanier, (Ala.) 101 So. 763. 
Central Coal Co. v. Hartman, 111 Fed. 96. 
Whitehead v. Cape Henry Syn. (Vir.) 68 S.E. 
Shreveport Laundries, Inc. v. Red Iron Drill-
ing Co., Inc. (La.) 192 )-o. 895. 
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Mensing v. Wright, (Kan.) 119 Pac. 374. 
Landon v. Hill, 29 Pac. 2d 281, (Cal.) 
It is submitted that from the evidence in this record 
there was no established business damaged by the actions 
of the defendant, even admitting for the purpose of argu-
ment only, that they were wrongful and consequently 
there can be no damages awarded in favor of the plain-
tiffs in this case. 
Bearing these propositions in mind a reading of the 
record discloses that the required tests were not met by 
plaintiffs' proof. The plaintiffs testified that in 1952 they 
had capacity to handle and care for 14,000 turkeys and 
that they would have raised that many birds if the financ-
ing had been available. They asserted that for 1953 and 
1954 they would have duplicated 1952 by raising the same 
number of birds. They next proceeded to show that in 
those years, instead of raising 14,000 turkeys, Nalder, Sr. 
had only raised 1,000, 1,500 and 2,000 respectively. They 
introduced in evidence, over defendant's timely objections, 
exhibits purporting to show how much profit was made 
on the turkeys actually sold in those years, and that the 
profit had been so much per bird. They then took this 
figure and computed the difference between the actual 
profit and what it would have been if they had raised all 
the turkeys which they claimed and insisted they had 
capacity and intention to raise. The trial court went along 
with this theory and based upon the evidence described, 
awarded the damages complained of. 
It is contended by defendant that by so doing the 
trial court committed further serious and reversible error. 
In the first place, it must be most obvious that any 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
such proof is highly speculative and uncertain. It is like-
wise self-serving. For example, what was there to prevent 
the plaintiffs from asserting that they would have raised 
20,000 or 25,000 turkeys? They could have made such 
a claim just as easily as they asserted they would have 
raised 14,000 turkeys. Such proof entirely ignores the 
possibility that plaintiffs might have quit the turkey busi-
ness, that they might have had prohibitive losses, or that 
market conditions might have been unfavorable so that 
granted they actually raised all the birds they claimed they 
wanted to raise, the whole operation might be a loss and 
not a profit. 
The foregoing abundant authority shows the way in 
which loss of future or anticipated profits are to be proven. 
POINT 7 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
RECEIVING IN EVIDENCE, OVER DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTION, PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBITS ttM", ((N" 
AND no" FOR THE REASON THAT SAID EXHIB-
ITS WERE INCOMPETENT, IRRELEVANT AND 
IMMATERIAL TO ESTABLISH PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM 
OF LOST PROFITS. 
Under Point 6 of this brief we have already argued 
that the court erred in awarding damages to plaintiffs for 
loss of anticipated or future profits because there was no 
relationship between the damages awarded and the plain-
tiffs' experience in the turkey business prior to the alleged 
interference by defendant. We now wish to make com-
ment upon the exhibits which the court received over the 
objection of defendant from which the court purportedly 
made his findings and determination of damages. 
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In this connection, Exhibit ttp" was offered to prove 
the competence of the Nalders as turkey raisers. Objection 
was made because the exhibit was immaterial hearsay evi-
dence taken from books kept by other persons. This ob-
jection was summarily overruled by the trial court. Ex-
hibits ((T" and HU" were offered to show the amount and 
cost of feed used by H. William Nalder, Sr. in 1953 and 
1954. Exhibit ttX" was offered to prove the number of 
turkeys purchased from Nalder, Sr. in 1953 by the Lee 
Brown Co. Exhibit HW" was offered to show the number 
of turkey poults purchased in 1953 and 1954 by H. Wil-
liam Nalder, Sr. and Exhibit HV" was the written offer 
of Lee Brown Co. to purchase H. William Nalder, Sr.'s 
1954 turkeys. All of the alleged facts shown by said ex-
hibits were supposedly summarized in Exhibits HM", HN" 
and ((0", which were offered to prove the damages sus-
tained by all the plaintiffs based upon H. William Nalder, 
Sr.'s operations in 1952, 1953 and 1954. In none of those 
years did Mrs. Nalder or H. William Nalder, Jr. raise tur-
keys so that at the outset we are faced with a situation 
from which it is impossible for anyone even to speculate 
on how much profit they might have made in those years 
in the turkey business, even adopting the theory of dam-
ages used by plaintiffs. By some mental process unfathom-
able to defendant, the experience of the plaintiff, H. Wil-
liam Nalder, Sr., was translated into the non-existent ex-
perience of H. William N alder, Jr. and Mrs. N alder and 
adopted by the court as the experience of H. William 
N alder, Jr. and Mrs. N alder in raising turkeys in 19 52, 
1953 and 1954. On no other hypothesis could any claim 
to damages in favor of H. William Nalder, Jr. or Mrs. 
Nalder be postulated. If their past experience in 1949, 
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1950 and 1951 had to be relied on as a basis for damages 
there could be no finding of damage in their favor because 
there was no profit made during those years. Further-
more, H. William Nalder, Jr. abandoned the turkey busi-
ness in 1952 and never went back to it. (Tr. 146-148) 
Mrs. N alder never engaged in the business, much less 
abandoned it. 
An examination of Exhibits ((M", uN" and ceO" 
shows that in computing the expenses for 1952, 1953 and 
1954 Nalder, Sr. charged himself for turkey poults, feed, 
brooder expense, i.e., electricity, herder (wages) and pro-
cessing. He deducted these items from the amounts he 
claimed he received from the sale of the turkeys and he 
then designates all the rest as profit. It seems strange in-
deed that overnight beginning in 1952, Nalder, Sr. was 
by some mysterious necromancy transformed from a fail-
ure to an outstanding success, without any logical explana-
tion for the sudden and swift change. Apparently he had 
the same facilities in the earlier years, the same know-how 
and astuteness, but somehow could not make his enter-
prise a success. In November, 19 51, the N alders confessed 
themselves as failures and the results of their operations 
confirmed their confession. A critical examination of 
Exhibits ((M", uN" and uo" perhaps will reveal at least 
some of the reasons why Nalder, Sr. looked better in 1952, 
1953 and 1954 than in those earlier years. In the first 
place, he was handling a much smaller flock of turkeys 
and perhaps could handle them better. A much more 
reasonable explanation, however, lies in the fact that these 
exhibits do not reveal the whole picture. Nalder, Sr. fails 
to charge his turkey operations with many proper ex-
penses which in all conscience must be charged in every 
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properly conducted business enterprise. For instance, 
there is no charge made for taxes, loans, interest on bor-
rowed money, depreciation, insurance, maintenance or the 
reasonable value of his own labor and time expended in 
raising the turkeys. Everyone of such items was undoubt-
edly incurred. We know he borrowed money "from First 
Security Bank with the endorsement of Mr. Rasmussen. 
(Tr. 171) It would be naive to believe that the loan was 
made without interest or that Nalder, Sr. was not required 
to repay the principal. (Tr. 162, 171, 219) The ma-
teriality and competence of these exhibits was destroyed by 
these omissions and they are worthless for the purpose of 
arriving at the profits which were made in 1952, 1953 and 
1954. Defendant objected to the introduction of the ex-
hibits and the objections were overruled. These objections 
were well taken and the court's action in overruling them 
and admitting the exhibits was seriously prejudicial to the 
defendant. 
POINT 8 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE THERE IS NO COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT'S FAILURE OR RE-
FUSAL TO RELEASE EITHER ITS REAL ESTATE 
OR CHATTEL MORTGAGES WAS THE PROXI-
MATE CAUSE OF ANY LOSS TO PLAINTIFFS, H. 
WILLIAM NALDER, SR., AND JR. 
The judgment awarded by the trial court in this case 
rests upon the unsupported conclusion of plaintiffs that 
the reason for their inability to obtain turkey financing for 
1952, 1953 and 1954 was that the record in the County 
Recorder's Office in Davis County, Utah showed the real 
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estate and chattel mortgages, pleaded in plaintiffs' com-
plaint, unsatisfied and unreleased. Plaintiffs' asserted their 
complete ignorance of the condition of this record until 
notified by Mr. Rasmussen of this fact in 1954. (Tr. 
163-164, 76-7, 102, 105-6, 158-9, 180) The record will 
not support plaintiffs in this claim of ignorance. They 
were notified in writing by defendant that the mortgages 
were not released twice in 1950. (Ex. uE-5", ((E-6") 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs carried on correspondence with 
defendant in 1952 and 1953 requesting subordination of 
defendant's debt. (Ex. uF-16-25") They could hardly be 
ignorant of the fact that the requirement of a subordina-
tion agreement by General Mills Co. was for the purpose 
of clearing the record of these mortgages and to constitute 
the General Mills obligation a first lien. Furthermore, 
Nalder, Jr., in his application to General Mills, listed as 
one of his liabilities a mortgage payable to defendant. 
(Ex. ul-1) In a memorandum dated December, 1951, 
reference is made to unreleased chattel mortgages which 
would have to be released or subordinated. (Ex. 1-4) Pre-
sumably this subject was discussed with Nalder, Jr. for he 
made several attempts to get defendant to give him such 
a subordination. (Tr. 106-108) See also Exhibit ul-8". 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs well understood the purpose of 
a subordination agreement. They requested defendant in 
1950 to subordinate defendant's debt to the first mortgage 
on their home, which request defendant granted. (Tr. 21) 
This pretended lack of knowledge by plaintiffs is uncon-
vincing and not very significant except that it gives a good 
insight into plaintiffs' willingness to slant testimony to 
their own advantage. 
Returning now to the more important question of the 
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reason why plaintiffs could not get financing for all the 
turkeys they assert they wished to raise after 1951, the 
record is clear that none of the companies to whom they 
made application ever told them that they were so denied 
because defendant did not release mortgages. It is clear 
that Ralston-Purina did not. (Tr. 169, 177, 180) Neith-
er did General Mills (Ex. HI") nor Farmer's Grain (Tr. 
158) nor Pillsbury. (Tr. 159) No one authorized to rep-
resent and speak for any lending agency testified directly 
or indirectly that his company, except for the mortgages 
referred to, would finance the N alders, all or any of them, 
to such extent as to raise 14,000 or any number of turkeys. 
In the absence of such testimony there is no basis for any 
award against defendant. 
Nalder, Jr. stated that the General Mills credit man-
ager, Stevens, told him that the application to that com-
pany would be approved if subordination of the Kellogg 
debt was obtained. (Tr. 159) However, Stevens, plain-
tiffs' own witness, when asked if such was the fact, definite-
ly refused to confirm that statement. (Tr. 250-52) Stev-
ens made it clear that the application would have required 
further consideration by the credit manager in California. 
Exhibit ul-6" attests eloquently to the fact that matters 
relating to plaintiffs' business ability, credit rating and 
general reputation were in serious question. Furthermore, 
the General Mills application, if granted, would have lim-
ited Nalder, Jr. to 5,000 turkeys, not 14,000. 
Rasmussen, a Ralston-Purina feed dealer, testified 
that plaintiffs' applications were not approved because of 
defendant's unreleased mortgages, but that statement was 
nothing but his own unsupported conclusion. (Tr. 136) 
He was not an agent of the company and had nothing to 
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do with its credit policies. (Tr. 169) If any statement 
made by him could have been attributed to Ralston-Purina 
it was only hearsay and consequently was inadmissable as 
a statement of fact. 
It is submitted, therefore, that nothing in the record 
will support plaintiffs' contention that had defendant re-
leased its mortgages credit would have been available to 
them from other sources. If such a contention could be 
supported at all, it is only an inference from the fact that 
these mortgages were unreleased. The testimony of Stev-
ens and Exhibit ul" destroy even that inference. But, in 
addition, there are other facts also in the record which 
further weaken or destroy any such inference, if it would 
otherwise be permissible at all. None of these other factors 
related to defendant's unreleased mortgages. It is de-
fendant's contention that they were quite as much respon-
sible for plaintiff's unsuccessful attempts to get financing 
as were the unreleased mortgages of defendant. In fact, 
we go further and contend that even in the absence of 
any mortgage of record in defendant's name, there is 
sound support for the argument that plaintiffs probably 
could not have obtained credit elsewhere. We submit that 
these other facts, being such as might have prevented plain-
tiffs from obtaining such credit, the burden of proof was 
upon the plaintiffs to show that the other facts to which 
we shall now refer were not an obstacle to plaintiffs' financ-
Ing. 
First of all we repeat that the reference in Exhibit 
ul-6" to plaintiffs' unsuccessful turkey operations before 
1952; to plaintiffs as upoor financial risks; the deficit from 
the 1949 operations, pending litigation, past record of poor 
payr~ including collection suits, mortgaging of household 
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goods, etc." all pointing to a ustrapped" financial condi-
tion, are of more than passing significance on this question 
of whether defendant's unreleased mortgages was the only 
cause of plaintiffs' difficulty. Furthermore, as we have 
already pointed out, two of defendant's real estate mort-
gages, Exhibits uC-3" and uC-9", were subsisting, valid 
and unpaid obligations totaling over $13,000.01>, even if 
it were admitted that all other mortgages should have been 
released. These two mortgages certainly could be main-
tained of record until paid because they expressly recited 
that they were to secure all of plaintiffs' obligations to de-
fendant. In addition, the Deseret Federal Savings & Loan 
Association held a $9,000.00 real estate mortgage on the 
home of N alder, Sr. and his wife. The mortgage was re-
ferred to in both applications made by plaintiff to Ralston-
Purina. (Ex. uH" and uQ") It may be presumed that this 
mortgage was of record because in 1950 defendant sub-
ordinated its then existing real estate mortgage to that 
debt. (Tr. 21) 
Young Nalder, in his application to General Mills, 
(Ex. cci") referred to a chattel mortgage of $2,500.00 and 
a real estate mortgage of $2,500.00 and to $2,500.00 of 
obligations to defendant. This showed then a total of 
$7,500.00 owed by Nalder, Jr. by his own admission. We 
believe it may be fairly assumed that these mortgages were 
likewise of record. Even eliminating all of defendant's 
mortgages, plaintiffs were owing valid obligations of 
$16,500.00 to other creditors at the very time they claim 
it was only due to defendant's misconduct that their busi-
ness was destroyed. There is nothing in the record to show 
that General Mills, Ralston-Purina, Pillsbury or Farmer's 
Grain were not influenced by this credit picture. It is 
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only reasonable to assume that at least they might have 
been very much influenced by these facts. 
That plaintiffs were required to prove defendant's 
acts the proximate cause of their damage is elementary. 
The case of Ebbert v. First National Bank of Condon, 
(Ore.) 279 Pac. 534 is closely analogous to this case in that 
in the Condon case the plaintiff likewise was claiming dam-
ages because of the alleged wrongful refusal of the defend-
ant bank to release some chattel mortgages. The court 
makes these observations: 
((The recovery of the item of $37,808.08 was 
ventured upon the contention that the defendant 
wrongfully and purposely failed to satisfy the 
mortgage records and thereby caused the Oregon-
Washington Joint Stock Land Bank of Portland to 
reject his application for a mortgage loan in the sum 
of $25,000. Before that incident could become an 
element of damages, it was necessary that the evi-
dence should show (a) that in ,the absence of the 
wrongful act there was a reasonable likelihood that 
the loan would have been made, and (b) that the 
defendant's neglect caused the rejection of the ap-
plication." 
The court then goes on to recite that in the application for 
the loan the plain tiff had listed certain mortgage obliga-
tions and had omitted others, including the existence of 
the mortgages which it was claimed the defendant should 
have released. (Parenthetically, it is most interesting to 
observe that in their applications to the Ralston-Purina 
Company these plaintiffs omitted any mention of the exist-
ence of the mortgages or debt owing to the defendant.) 
Also, there was evidence that the applicant had misrepre-
sented certain facts and that was given as a reason for 
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turning down the plaintiffs' application. There was a 
whole series of chattel mortgages which the plaintiff had 
failed to mention in his application, including unpaid 
taxes. There was evidence concerning a prospective buy-
er of the plaintiffs' property which the court discusses. It 
was pointed out that at the time the property was in the 
process of foreclosure that there was no summer fallow and 
that the prospective buyer discovered other mortgages on 
the record and that various factors were discovered by him 
which persuaded him to discontinue his negotiations, and 
then the court says: 
((* * ::- Such a remote possibility of injury is 
too uncertain to be recoverable as damages. Suther-
land on Damages (4th Ed.) 53; Sedgwick on Dam-
ages (8th Ed.) Sec. 170. The following apt lan-
guage of Mr. Justice McBride in Spain v. Oregon-
Washington R. & N. Co., 78 Or. 355, 153 P. 470, 
475, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1104, is applicable: (When 
the evidence leaves the case in such a situation that 
the jury will be required to speculate and guess 
which of several possible causes occasioned the in-
jury, that part of the case should be withdrawn 
from their consideration.' " 
In the case of Shealy's Inc. v. So. Bell Tel. 5 Tel. Co., 
126 Fed. Supp. 3 82, the plaintiff claimed damages for loss 
of business due to the failure of the defendant to publish 
an advertisement in its directory. The court held that the 
element of damage claimed was so remote and uncertain 
under the evidence that no recovery could be allowed. 
The plaintiff actually showed that its profits for a nine 
months period prior to the breach of contract were greater 
when the advertisement appeared in the directory, than 
they were during the period when it had been omitted. 
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In other words, the plaintiff followed the correct theory 
of comparison between past experience and profits during 
the period when the wrong was committed. Nevertheless 
the court had this to say: 
uThe injury suffered, if any, by the plaintiff 
was the loss of such profits as would have resulted 
from the publishing of the advertisement. Whether 
the plaintiff's gross profits would have increased if 
the advertisement had been published is a matter 
of mere speculation and conjecture. Since the 
plaintiff has failed to introduce any evidence even 
tending to show that its gross sales would have been 
increased had the advertisement been published, the 
mere fact that the gross profits for a preceding pe-
riod were in excess of the gross profits for the pe-
riod during which the advertisement was omitted 
from the directory is insufficient to show that the 
decrease in gross profits was the proximate result 
of the defendant's failure to publish the advertise-
ment. Their causal relation to the breach is purely 
speculative." 
A strikingly similar case to the one under consider-
ation is United States v. Huff, 175 Fed. 2d, 678 where a 
plaintiff claimed damages for lost sheep and goats because 
the defendant had destroyed fences. In commenting on 
the evidence the court said: 
ult therefore becomes patent that the evidence 
as to the loss of these animals in each case fails to 
rise above mere speculation and guess. 
uWhile it may be inviting to approve the trial 
court's findings and allow at least a partial recovery 
for such losses, it remains our solemn duty under 
this evidence to disallow these unproved claims, as 
it is well settled that speculative damages are not 
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recoverable. It was incumbent upon these plain-
tiffs to adduce some clear and convincing proof of 
specific losses resulting solely from the Govern-
ment's failure to repair and maintain the fences 
and this they have signally failed to do." 
See also Addison-Miller, Inc. v. U. S., 70 Fed. Supp. 
893; William H. Schwanke, Inc. v. Wis. Tel Co., (Wis.) 
227 N.W. 30; Tribune Co. v. Bradshaw, (Ill.), 20 Ill. App. 
17; Stevens v. Yale, (Mich.) 72 N.W. 5; Winston Cigar-
ette Machine Co. v. Wells-Whitehead Tobacco Co., (N.C) 
53 SE 885; Murray v. Texas Co., (S.C.) 174 S.E. 231; 
Harman v. Western Union Tel. Co., (S.C.) 43 S.E. 959. 
As long as there are factors involved in this case which 
just as effectively could have prevented these plaintiffs 
from securing their financing in 1952, 1953 and 1954 as 
the existence of defendant's recorded chattel mortgages 
and unless there is evidence in the record which eliminates 
those factors as a possible reason for the rejection of their 
applications, there is no showing of proximate cause and 
the judgment rendered by the court rests upon specula-
tion and guess and cannot be permitted to stand. See also 
Blakely Printing Co. v. Ft. Dearborn Mercantile Co., 
supra; Jenson v. S. H. Kress Co., 87 Utah 434, 49 Pac. 2d 
958; Tremelling v. So. Pac. Co. 257 Pac. 1066 70 Utah 72; 
Virend v. Utah Ore Sampling Co., 48 Utah 398, 160 Pac. 
115 and Quinn v. Utah Gas f5 Coke Co., 42 Utah 113, 129 
Pac. 362. Notwithstanding the utter lack of causation to 
support plaintiffs' claim, the judgment complained of was 
rendered by the trial court which, in the interest of 
justice, now requires reversal. 
POINT 9 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE 
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REVERSED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE CONCLU-
SIVELY ESTABLISHES THAT DEFENDANT ACTED 
IN GOOD FAITH. 
Evidence supporting the above proposition is found 
in the testimony of the witness, Williams, appearing on 
pages 211, 212, 216, 277 and 270 of the transcript. There 
is nothing in the record contradicting this testimony. This 
being the only evidence on the question, the trial court 
could not ignore it or make a finding contrary to it. Any 
finding made by the court contrary to this testimony un-
supported by evidence. impeaching its credibility is 
against the evidence and hence is reversible error. On the 
question of good faith as a defense for failure or refusal 
to release a mortgage, this court has spoken in Shibata v. 
Bear River State Bank, supra. In that case the plaintiff was 
denied recovery because defendant in not releasing a mort-
gage was acting upon the advice of its attorney in good 
faith. This court uses this language (eferring to Sec. 
57-3-8: 
((The above statute is penal in nature and 
should be strictly construed. It is not meant 
to penalize one who honestly, though mistakenly 
refuses to discharge or release a mortgage of record 
because he believes there has been no full satisfac-
tion. Under the facts and circumstances of this 
case where the bank, relying upon the advice of an 
attorney, honestly thinks that it had valid and sub-
sisting mortgages against appellant which had not 
been sa tis:fied, refused to release the mortgages, it 
was acting in good faith and was therefore not 
liable for damages under the above section." 
See also International Harvester Co. v. Simpson, supra. 
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There is proof in the record from which it conclu-
sively appears that the defendant was relying on the ad-
vice of its counsel. It must be presumed that defendant 
acted in good faith when it was following a policy with 
regard to releasing mortgages laid down by its counsel as 
a business procedure to protect the best interests of the 
defendant. The policy was, to retain all mortgages as 
long as there was unpaid indebtedness owing to the com-
pany. It is submitted that the court could not ignore the 
testimony of the witness Williams and refuse to give it 
any credit whatsoever without some evidence in the record 
which would indicate that the defendant was not acting 
in good faith. 
POINT 10 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OVER DEFEND-
ANT'S OBJECTIONS THAT SCOVILLE, EREKSON 
AND SCHINKER PROMISED OR AGREED ON BE-
HALF OF DEFENDANT TO RELEASE MORTGAGES 
WITH NO PRELIMINARY SHOWING OF AGENCY 
OR AUTHORITY OF SAID PERSONS TO MAKE 
SUCH PROMISES, AND FOR THE FURTHER REA-
SON THAT UNCONTROVERTED TESTIMONY 
ESTABLISHES THAT SAID PERSONS HAD NO 
SUCH AUTHORITY. 
The court permitted the plaintiffs to testify to 
promises or agreements supposedly made by Scoville, Erek-
son and Schinker relating to release of the 1949 chattel 
mortgage and to defendant's agreement to accept the real 
estate mortgage of August 15, 1950 as payment of said 
chattel mortgage and other alleged promises related to 
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the release of the chattel mortgages of 1950 and 1951. 
(Tr. 101-103, 105, 108, 149-53) The witness Erekson 
denied that he made any promise on defendant's behalf. 
On the contrary he specifically and categorically denied 
that he had any authority to do so. (Tr. 256-58, 263) 
There is nothing in the record showing that Scoville, a 
salesman of the defendant, had such authority. The same 
observation applies to Schinker. Mr. Williams specifically 
testified that none of these individuals had such authority. 
(Tr. 211-12, 215-17, 267, 270) The documentary evi-
dence relating to releases (Ex. HE-5" and uE-6") written 
by Schinker, do not contain any promissory language, but 
on the contrary state that no mortgages could be released 
until Mr. Williams, the general manager, gave his ap-
proval. Exhibits uy", ((C-6" uC-7" conclusively show 
that the extent of Scoville's authority relating to one mort-
gage was to take it after it was prepared by Mr. Quinney 
to H. William Nalder, Sr. and get it signed. 
This court has many times passed upon the question 
of the proof required to establish agency to bind a prin-
cipal. In Witherow v. Mystic Toilers, 42 Utah 360, 130 
Pac. 58, this court makes this statement: 
uof course agency cannot be shown by dec-
larations of the agent. And, before declarations of 
the agent may be received as admissions against his 
principal, the agency and the authority of the 
agent must first be shown. Here neither was shown. 
Nor is it true, as the court seems to indicate in the 
charge, that declarations of an agent, to show 
agency, go merely to the question of sufficiency of 
the evidence to show such relation, and hence may 
be considered for such purpose, in connection with 
other evidence. The authorities, we think, are to 
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the effect that such evidence is incompetent for 
such purpose, and that the fact of agency must be 
established by evidence dehors the declarations of 
the agent. 
In Jenson v. S. H. Kress Co., supra, plaintiff was permitted 
to testify to a hearsay statement of a former employee of 
the defendant without a showing that the statement made 
was binding on the defendant because made in the course 
of employment or under authority. It was held that the 
statement testified to by plaintiff was hearsay and was not 
binding upon the defendant. See Booth v. Nelson, 61 
Utah 239, 211 Pac. 985, and 20 Am. fur. P. 508, Sec. 598, 
and Cole v. Myers, (Conn.) 21 Atl. 2d 396. 
It is submitted, therefore, that all of the evidence in 
this case relating to the question of promises or agree-
ments made to release the chattel mortgages or to accept 
the real estate mortgage (Ex. HC-9") in satisfaction of the 
1949 chattel mortgage were inadmissible, and should have 
been stricken from the record when motion to strike the 
same was made by the defendant. 
POINT 11 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE ADMIS-
SION OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND IN NUMER-
OUS RULINGS ON OBJECTIONS TO LEADING 
AND OTHER IMPROPER QUESTIONS PRO-
POUNDED BY COUNSEL. 
During the course of the trial, Exhibit HP", which 
had been prepared by the witness Boothe, a Ralston-Purina 
salesman, was offered in evidence. (Tr. 70-73) As a 
foundation for the exhibit Boothe testified that the infor-
mation from which it had been compiled had been furn-
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ished by plaintiff N alder who had obtained it from the 
books of the Lee Brown Company and Rasmussen Grain 
Company. The admission of this exhibit was objected to 
by defendant upon the ground that it was hearsay. It is 
submitted that the objection was well taken and should 
have been sustained. The exhibit was damaging to the 
defendant because it purported to show plaintiffs as com-
petent turkey raisers. 
Throughout the trial, counsel asked leading and sug-
gestive questions in direct examination of the plaintiffs. 
Repeated objections were made to such questions which 
were denied by the court. It is submitted that all such 
objections should have been sustained. The trial court ap-
parently proceeded upon the assumption that since no 
jury was involved in the trial of the case it was immaterial 
what form the questions of counsel might take. Never-
theless, all such questions were highly improper and their 
repeated asking should have been ordered discontinued. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case establishes that plaintiffs are 
indebted to defendant for the amount demanded in de-
fendant's answer and counterclaim. On the other hand, 
the record clearly demonstrates that defendant was fully 
entitled to retain all mortgages of record, and that it did 
so acting in good faith and upon advice of counsel. There 
is a complete failure of proof that the existence of defend-
ant's mortgages upon the records was the cause of plain-
tiffs' alleged losses and the judgment in plaintiffs' favor is 
founded upon incompetent evidence of damage. Further-
more, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff, Cathe-
rine Nalder, to which she was clearly not entitled, and like-
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wise, judgment was granted in favor of H. William Nal-
der, Jr. for failure to release real estate mortgages not 
signed or executed by him and he was awarded punitive 
damages under a statute which he had no right to evoke. 
For all of the reasons referred to in this brief the judg-
ment should be reversed with directions to enter judgment 
for defendant for the amount due upon its mortgage and 
to enter a decree of foreclosure and order of sale and dis-
missing the complaint of plaintiffs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
ALBERT R. BOWEN 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellants 
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